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a b s t r a c t 
We use a large housing transaction data set in Singapore to study whether real estate 
agents use information advantages to buy houses at bargain prices. Agents bought their 
own houses at prices that are 2.54% lower than comparable houses bought by other buyers. 
Consistent with information asymmetries, agent buyers have more information advantages 
in less informative environments, and agent buyers are more likely to buy houses from 
agent sellers. Agent discounts are from both “cherry picking” and bargaining power, and 
bargaining power contributes more to the agent discounts. Agents’ advantage consists in 
their information of available houses and previous purchase prices. 
© 2019 Published by Elsevier B.V. 
1. Introduction 
Real estate agents play an important intermediary role 
in housing markets. They use their local market knowl- 
edge to bridge the information gap between potential 
buyers and sellers. Real estate agents use their information 
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advantage in the housing market to reduce search costs 
and improve matching between buyers and sellers. Buyers 
and sellers pay a commission to real estate agents, usually 
a fraction of the transaction price, 1 for their services in 
brokering a real estate deal. If real estate agents are merely 
motivated by commissions, they might be induced to close 
deals in the shortest possible time, even to the extent of 
not revealing full information to the parties involved in 
the transactions. Most real estate agents are reluctant to 
seek the best attainable prices for their clients because the 
1 In the US, the commission rates range between 5% and 6%. Prior to 
September 2008, real estate agents in Singapore charged about a 1% com- 
mission from sellers for a transaction in the private housing market. Buy- 
ers usually do not have to pay a commission to an agent. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jﬁneco.2019.05.008 
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effort needed to obtain those prices is not commensurate 
with incremental increases in agents’ commissions. 
Previous studies apply two different strategies to test 
real estate agents’ information advantage. The ﬁrst strategy 
compares housing transactions with and without agents. 
Hendel et al. (2009) ﬁnd no evidence that houses sold 
via the multiple listing service (MLS) networks command 
premiums relative to those sold by owners using the for- 
sale-by-owner (FSBO) platform. Based on the listing data 
obtained from Stanford University’s Faculty Staff Housing 
(FSH) oﬃce, Bernheim and Meer (2013) ﬁnd that using 
full-service brokers reduces sale prices of a typical home 
by 5.9%–7.7%. The results imply that the local knowledge 
and expertise provided by real estate agents in the MLS 
listings are not correlated with higher house selling prices. 
They argue that broker services should be unbundled 
from MLS listings. The second strategy compares agents’ 
own housing transactions and clients’ housing transac- 
tions. Rutherford et al. (2005) show that agents sell their 
own houses for a premium of approximately 4.5%, whereas 
Levitt and Syverson (2008) ﬁnd that houses owned by real 
estate agents sell for approximately 3.7% more than other 
houses. The evidence suggests the presence of agents’ in- 
formation advantage in the housing market. 
Earlier studies invariably focus on the sell-side activities 
of real estate agents in the US because tracking properties 
and sellers is easier than tracking the identities of buyers. 
In this paper, we use the buy-side activities of real estate 
agents from a unique set of Singaporean data. This study 
on the buy side of agents, together with the previous liter- 
ature on sell side, provide a complete picture of the role of 
real estate agents in housing markets. Similar to the sec- 
ond strategy, we empirically test whether agents use in- 
formation advantages to buy their own houses at prices 
that are lower than the houses they broker for other buy- 
ers. We merge a data set consisting of more than 10 0,0 0 0 
private housing transactions with a data set of real estate 
agents (salespersons) registered with the Council of Estate 
Agencies (CEA). The merged data set allows us to iden- 
tify houses purchased by agents for their own use (the 
treatment group) and houses bought by other buyers (the 
control group). We test whether the prices of agent-own 
housing purchases are lower than comparable houses pur- 
chased by nonagent buyers. Our results show that real es- 
tate agents paid approximately 2.54% less for their own 
houses than did other individuals. 2 
Why do real estate agents pay lower prices when buy- 
ing their own houses? One explanation is related to in- 
formation asymmetries in the housing market; real estate 
agents have information advantages over less-informed 
nonagent buyers. We show that agent buyers with in- 
formation advantages in a less informative environment 
are more likely to obtain bargain prices for their own 
2 In Singapore, it is illegal for buyers and sellers to deliberately under- 
report sale prices, and the scenario in which agent buyers use their com- 
mission to partially offset the transaction price is unlikely to occur. More- 
over, underreporting the sale price would not be to the agent buyers’ ad- 
vantage because their bank loans are computed based on the transaction 
prices. The agent buyers would need to provide more cash for the trans- 
actions if price is underreported. 
purchases. Given that uninformed sellers are less willing 
to trade with agent buyers, we ﬁnd that agent buyers are 
more likely to buy houses from agent sellers. These results 
are consistent with the predictions of information asym- 
metries in Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004) and Levitt and 
Syverson (2008) . However, we show that agents’ ﬂipping 
strategy and their ability to time the market are unlikely 
to explain our main results. 
If agents have information advantages, what are the 
possible sources of those advantages? The key innovation 
in our study is that we explore two strategies to inves- 
tigate the sources of information advantage: sellers’ char- 
acteristics and house listing information. In the ﬁrst strat- 
egy, we use the merged data set that includes agent buy- 
ers’ and agent sellers’ characteristics and study the inter- 
action between agent buyers and weak sellers. There are 
two possible channels through which agents could exploit 
information advantages. First, agents can use information 
advantages to cherry pick bargain deals from weak sell- 
ers. For example, agents buy houses from distressed sell- 
ers who were involved in lawsuits. We use two groups of 
sellers-individuals and distressed sellers, where the latter 
represent the weak sellers who are disadvantaged by law- 
suit events. However, we ﬁnd no evidence that agents ex- 
ploit information advantages to cherry pick weak sellers in 
housing transactions. Second, agents use information ad- 
vantages to tilt their bargaining power against weak sell- 
ers who face time pressure to sell their houses quickly. We 
ﬁnd strong evidence that agent buyers pay lower prices 
relative to nonagent buyers when buying houses for their 
own use from these distressed sellers; agents also pay 
lower prices when buying houses for their own occupation 
from individuals and institutions, but no price discounts 
are found for houses bought from investors. The results 
are consistent with the bargaining power story, implying 
that agents use information advantages to obtain price dis- 
counts when buying houses from weak sellers. 
The second empirical strategy is to use the merged data 
set to analyze the interaction between agent buyers and 
house listing information. We argue that agent buyers’ dis- 
counts could come from cherry picking houses with low 
purchase prices and/or agents’ power in bargaining down 
prices in the purchases. One source of information advan- 
tage is the agents’ access to a larger choice set of houses 
for sale in the course of their dealings as agents repre- 
senting potential sellers; they can then use the listing in- 
formation, which is not accessible to nonagent buyers, to 
cherry pick cheaper houses. The second source of infor- 
mation advantage is evidenced in agents’ ability to obtain 
larger discounts relative to nonagent buyers by bargaining 
down prices from the listing prices. Compared to nonagent 
buyers, we ﬁnd that agents choose houses approximately 
0.50% lower than the listing price, which is equivalent to 
approximately 20% of an agent’s discount on the transac- 
tion prices as in the main results. By contrast, agent buyers 
bargain the price down by 1.8% more from the listing price, 
which is approximately 70% of the agents’ discount to the 
prices in the main results. The results are consistent with 
the fact that agent buyers use information advantages (ac- 
cess to the listing prices) to obtain larger discounts when 
bargaining in their housing purchases. 
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Our paper makes three contributions to the broader lit- 
erature. Our ﬁrst contribution is related to the role of in- 
termediaries in the markets. In ﬁnancial markets, banks, as 
ﬁnancial intermediaries, help bridge the information gap 
between users (borrowers) and suppliers (depositors) of 
funds in the ﬁnancial markets. In the stock market, insti- 
tutional investors routinely make use of brokers to execute 
their trades ( Barbon et al., 2017; Di Maggio et al., 2017 ). 
Likewise, in housing markets, appraisals bridge the infor- 
mation gap between buyers and sellers/banks by provid- 
ing an independent assessment on housing values for the 
purposes of determining the loan quantum ( Agarwal et al., 
2015 ; Agarwal et al, 2019; Agarwal et al., 2017 ), whereas 
real estate agents with their local market knowledge re- 
duce search costs by matching sellers’ houses to prospec- 
tive buyers. Conﬂicts of interest may arise if ﬁnancial in- 
termediaries exploit their information advantages for pri- 
vate gain at the expense of uninformed clients. For exam- 
ple, banks take advantage of consumers’ limited knowledge 
by selling them high-risk ﬁnancial products with com- 
plex structures ( Di Maggio, Kermani, and Korgaonkar, 2015; 
Agarwal et al., 2017a ). In facilitating housing transactions, 
appraisers sometimes relent to client (usually a bank) pres- 
sure by producing appraisal values that are the same or 
close to the contract price in return for more repeated 
businesses from the same banks ( Agarwal et al., 2017b ). 
We ﬁnd that agent buyers have a greater information ad- 
vantage in a less informative environment. We also ﬁnd ev- 
idence of a high propensity of transactions between agent 
buyers and agent sellers, which implies that sellers pre- 
fer to trade with nonagent buyers without information ad- 
vantages. The results are consistent with the predictions 
of information asymmetries in Garmaise and Moskowitz 
(2004) and Levitt and Syverson (2008) . 
Our second contribution is to provide new empirical 
evidence to verify the hypothesis that experts use informa- 
tion advantages to cause distortions to housing markets. 3 
We show that agents use their information advantages 
to buy houses at signiﬁcant discounts from less-informed 
sellers in the informationally imperfect housing markets. 
Our results support the ﬁndings of Rutherford et al. 
(2005) and Levitt and Syverson (2008) , both of whom use 
data from sell-side activities to show that agent sellers 
exploit information advantages to sell their own houses 
for higher prices than those of comparable houses sold 
by individual sellers. Combining our evidence from the 
buy-side activities of housing markets with the sell-side 
evidence from the early studies, the literature is able 
to provide a more complete picture of the information 
advantages of real estate agents in housing markets. 
Our third contribution is made possible by the ability to 
connect multiple data sources, which allows us to identify 
two sources of information advantages and establish the 
channels through which information advantages are used 
by real estate agents. First, based on the listing data of 
3 A recent study by Allen et al. (2016) uses Miami-Dade County MLS 
data and ﬁnds that agent buyers pay 4% less than prices of comparable 
houses purchased by individual buyers. The data do not allow the authors 
to study the mechanism, and they also lack the exogenous shock that we 
exploit to study the change in the commission fee charged by the agents. 
agents, we are able to show that agent buyers with ac- 
cess to a larger choice set of housing listings could cherry 
pick houses with lower listing prices and then use their 
information advantages to bargain down the listing prices. 
Second, with the matched data on sellers’ involvement in 
law events, we ﬁnd that agent buyers obtain discounts in 
housing transactions from sellers only after knowing that 
sellers were declared bankrupt in the court records. We 
ﬁnd evidence of bargained prices only in houses purchased 
from weak (bankrupt) sellers by agent buyers; no such dis- 
counts prices are obtained by agent buyers in houses pur- 
chased from informed sellers (investors). 
2. Real estate brokerage industry in Singapore 
Singapore is an island nation with a land area of ap- 
proximately 716 square kilometers. As of 2013, it has a 
population size of 5.47 million, which includes 3.34 mil- 
lion citizens and 0.527 million permanent residents. The 
population is composed of a diverse mix of ethnic groups 
including 74% Chinese, 13% Malays, 9% Indians, and 3% of 
other races. 4 Singapore’s home ownership rate of more 
than 90% is one of the highest in the world. Public housing 
constitutes 81.55% of the total housing stocks, estimated at 
1.152 million units (as of 2012). The public housing is built 
by the government and sold to only Singaporean citizens at 
concessionary prices. The public market is highly regulated 
and is not a laisser-faire market. Therefore, we use only the 
non-landed private housing transactions, where price dis- 
covery is closer to the free market operations, in our em- 
pirical analyses. Non-landed housing, which includes con- 
dominiums and apartments, 5 is the largest segment of the 
private housing market constituting 12.14% of the total pri- 
vate housing stocks. 
In Singapore, the government established a new statu- 
tory board-the CEA-under the auspices of the Ministry of 
National Development (MND) on October 22, 2010, to act 
an industry watchdog for real estate agents. 6 The mission 
of the CEA is twofold: (i) to increase the professionalism 
of the real estate agency industry and (ii) to protect the 
interests of the consumers. The CEA is empowered by the 
Estate Agents Act (Chapter 95A) to regulate the practices 
of licensed agents and salespersons in real estate markets. 
As of March 31, 2013, there were 1495 real estate agency 
4 These and the following statistics of Singapore’s population and hous- 
ing market are drawn from the Population Trends 2014, Department of 
Statistics, Singapore. 
5 Condominiums and apartments are both high-rise and high density 
residential developments. Condominiums are projects with full facilities 
and are built on lands with a minimum size of 0.4 hectare. By contrast, 
apartments are projects with limited facilities built on smaller parcels 
of land. There are no restrictions on foreign ownership in condominium 
projects, but foreigners could only purchase apartments that are six sto- 
ries or higher under the Residential Properties Act. 
6 Prior to the establishment of the CEA, real estate agents were infor- 
mally regulated by two professional bodies, the Institute of Estate Agents 
(IEA) and Singapore Accredited Estate Agencies (SAEA), Limited. These 
two professional bodies did not have statutory power to license agents 
or bar unethical agents from practicing in Singapore. 
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ﬁrms and 32,982 real estate salespersons (agents) regis- 
tered with the CEA. 7 
In Singapore, real estate agents charge a seller a com- 
mission of approximately 1% to 2% of the sale price for 
closing a transaction in the private housing market. A 
buyer is usually not required to pay commission to a 
seller’s agent in a transaction. Buyers are not required 
to appoint an agent in a transaction. However, in cases 
in which a buyer has speciﬁc requirements on the type 
and/or the location of a property for an agent, he is re- 
quired to pay his agent a prenegotiated commission un- 
der the brokerage contracts after the agent buyer has ful- 
ﬁlled the requirements. After 2010, the CEA disallowed a 
dual representation arrangement, that is, an agent is not 
allowed to concurrently represent both a seller and a buyer 
in a transaction. 
3. Data sources and analyses 
3.1. Data sources 
We collect ﬁve different sources of data for our em- 
pirical analyses. The ﬁrst data set obtained from a propri- 
etary source comprises private (non-landed) housing trans- 
actions recorded in the caveats for the period from Jan- 
uary 1995 to December 2012. The data set contains in- 
formation on property attributes, such as property type 
(condominium or apartment), tenure, unit size, ﬂoor level 
and address, and transaction details, such as sale type 
(new sale, subsale, or resale), 8 transaction date, transaction 
price, and buyers’ and sellers’ proﬁles, such as names and 
their unique personal identiﬁcation numbers. 
The second proprietary data source contains demo- 
graphic information of approximately 70% of Singapore’s 
residents. Based on the unique identiﬁcation numbers, we 
match sellers in the transaction data set to the population 
data set to obtain information on their current home ad- 
dresses. By comparing the transacted property addresses 
and the residence addresses of sellers, we sort the sellers 
into one of the categories, either individuals (owner occu- 
piers) or investors. If a seller is a ﬁrm, it will be included 
in the third category known as “institution.” While these 
three categories of sellers were involved in resale transac- 
tions, we also separately identify new houses sold by de- 
velopers in the primary (precompletion) market. 
The third data set covers a full list of licensed real 
estate salespersons (agents) in the public registry of the 
CEA as of May 2014. The data set includes information 
7 Under the Estate Agency Act, the terms “estate agent” and “salesper- 
sons” have legal interpretations and meanings. The CEA deﬁnes estate 
agents as estate agency businesses (sole proprietors, partnerships, and 
companies) and salespersons as individuals who perform estate agency 
work. However, we use real estate agents and salespersons interchange- 
ably to represent individuals who are licensed to conduct real estate bro- 
kerage services for buyers/sellers of houses. 
8 There are three sale categories recorded in the transaction data. “New 
sale” and “subsale” consist of pre-completion units sold in the primary 
markets. The former includes units marketed and sold by developers in 
new launches, whereas the latter includes units bought and sold by in- 
dividual buyers before project completion. “Resale” refers to the sales of 
completed units in the secondary markets. 
on salesperson’s name, the name of the aﬃliated estate 
agency/ﬁrm, and the register number of the salesperson. 
We match the names of salespersons to the names of buy- 
ers in the transaction data set to identify agent buyers 
(the treatment group) and nonagent buyers (the control 
group). 9 
In contrast to the US, the MLS system is not widely 
used in Singapore. Real estate agents in Singapore source 
their listings, either open listings or exclusive listings, di- 
rectly from potential sellers. The agent listings are informa- 
tion exclusive to real estate agents, making those listings a 
choice set of houses for agents in our tests of information 
advantages. Real estate agents traditionally use print me- 
dia, such as newspapers, magazines, and ﬂyers, to advertise 
and disseminate information on houses for sale. Electronic 
portals started mushrooming after 2010, with popular por- 
tals such as PropertyGuru.com, 99.Co, and SRX. These por- 
tals gradually replace printed media as the main channel 
for housing listings and searches for agents and house buy- 
ers. We obtain the fourth data set, which collates the list- 
ings data from the major portals in Singapore for the pe- 
riod from 2010 to 2013. The data set contains information 
on housing address, listing price, size, posting date, and 
agents posting the listing. We merge the listing data with 
the resale transaction data from 2010 to 2012 using the 
house address, the posting date, and the transaction date 
(see Online Appendix A for detail). We are able to merge 
approximately 40% of the resale transaction to the listing 
data in the sample period. 
The last data set consists of the records of law events 
recorded in Singapore’s courts for the period from 1995 to 
2012. The law event records contain information on reg- 
istration time, nature of claim, level of courts, and out- 
comes. Based on the unique personal identiﬁcation num- 
bers of the plaintiff(s) and defendant(s) in each law event, 
we merge the law event data set with the property trans- 
action dataset. 
3.2. Descriptive statistics 
After merging the data on buyers, sellers, and law 
events into a master transaction data ﬁle and sieving out 
transactions with incomplete or wrong information, our ﬁ- 
nal sample contains a total of 108,534 transactions. Out of 
the total sample transactions, 5775 (5.32%) are agent buyer 
transactions (treatment group), and 102,759 (94.68%) are 
nonagent buyer transactions (control group). Fig. 1 shows 
the frequency of transactions by year for (A) the full sam- 
ple and (B) the agent buyer sample for the period from 
1995 to 2012. The trends of the two sets of transactions are 
quite similar, and the highest sale numbers were recorded 
in 2009. 
Fig. 2 plots the kernel density of total house prices for 
the agent buyers and the nonagent buyers. The red line 
representing housing prices for nonagent buyers is shifted 
slightly to the right, which indicates that houses bought by 
9 There are a small number of cases with similar names in both buy- 
ers’ and agents’ ﬁles, and robustness tests are done on these duplicated 
matched samples to remove possible biases. 
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Fig. 1. Transaction frequency over years. The ﬁgures show the transaction frequencies by year for the period from 1995 to 2012. Panel A shows the 
frequency distributions for the full sample, and Panel B shows the distributions for only the agent-buyer sample. 
nonagent buyers are more expensive than houses bought 
by agent buyers. 
We estimate the average total monthly house prices for 
the agent buyers and the nonagent buyers and test the 
presence of the month effects on agent discounts. Fig. 3 , 
Panel A shows that the average house prices for the agent 
buyers are lower than the average house prices for the 
nonagent buyers. The agent buyers pay lower prices than 
the nonagent buyers for houses bought in all months (un- 
adjusted for housing quality). Panel B shows that the agent 
buyers’ transactions constitute approximately 5% to 5.6% of 
the total sales across the 12-month period. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the main 
variables sorted by the full sample, the agent buyers (treat- 
ment sample), and the nonagent buyers (control sample). 
Panel A reports the statistics for the original sample, and 
Panel B reports the statistics for the paired samples de- 
rived using the propensity score matching (PSM) approach. 
Panel A shows that the average per square meter (psm) 
transaction price for the full sample of 108,534 houses 
is estimated at S$8245.58 psm. The average unit price of 
S$8127 psm is estimated for the agent buyer sample (5775 
houses), which is 1.5% lower than the average unit price 
of S$8252 psm for the nonagent buyer sample (102,759). 
The average total house price for the agent buyer sample 
is also lower than that for the nonagent buyer sample. 
We use the PSM technique to create a control 
group of buyers with matched characteristics, which 
include hedonic attributes (housing type, ﬂoor level, 
sale type), transaction year, property location, and buyer 
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Fig. 2. Kernel density plot of unit price per square meter. This ﬁgure shows the kernel density plots of unit price per square meter for agent and nonagent. 
The y -axis indicates the probability of density, and the x-axis indicates the value distribution of the unit price per square meter. 
characteristics (race, gender and marital status). Based on 
the propensity scores of the agent buyers’ transactions (the 
treatment group), we construct a balance sample of the 
non-agent buyers (the control group) using a one-to-one 
matching process. As shown by the descriptive statistics of 
the 5701 matched samples in Panel B of Table 1 , except for 
the transaction prices, the characteristics of the original 
agent-buyer sample (in term of housing attributes, and 
demographic characteristics of buyers) match the charac- 
teristics of the nonagent control sample generated by the 
PSM method. The average unit price of the agent buyer 
group is estimated at S$8123 psm, which was 1.63% lower 
than the average unit prices of S$8258 psm estimated for 
the matched nonagent buyer group. 
4. Empirical strategy and results 
In this section, we present our main empirical results. 
Section 4.1 presents the main results for agent price dis- 
counts. Section 4.2 discusses possible explanations and 
shows evidence that our main results are consistent with 
information asymmetries in the housing market; agents 
have information advantage over less-informed nonagent 
buyers. After showing agents’ information advantages, we 
investigate sources of information advantage by analyzing 
the weak sellers and house listing data in Sections 4.3 and 
4.4 , respectively. 
4.1. Do agents buy houses at lower prices? 
We test whether price differences exist in houses 
bought by the agent buyer group (treatment) and the 
nonagent buyer group (control) controlling for the spatial 
and the time ﬁxed effects. 10 The model speciﬁcation is 
given below: 
ln 
(
P i , d , t 
)
= α + β × Agen t it + γX i + μd + ϕ t + ε itd , (1) 
where the dependent variable ln (P i,d,t ) is the log-total price 
(S$) of house i located in a planning region d at time t . 
Agent it is a binary indicator that has a value of one if a 
buyer is an agent, and zero otherwise, that is, if he/she is 
a nonagent buyer. X i is a vector of regressors on the hedo- 
nic attributes of housing, such as housing type, ﬂoor level, 
sale type, and buyer’s characteristics-such as race (Chinese, 
Malay, Indian/others), gender, and marital status. μd and 
ϕt are the spatial ﬁxed effect and the time ﬁxed effects. α, 
β , and γ are the estimated regression coeﬃcients, and ε is 
the residual term of the regression. 
Table 2 presents the main results. We estimate the log- 
price models in Eq. (1) using (a) the full sample (Columns 
1, 2, 3, and 4), (b) the subsample of repeated sales 
(Columns 5 and 6), and the matched sample (Columns 7 
and 8). The main results (Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 ) 
show that agents buy their own houses at prices that 
are 2.54% lower than comparable houses brought by other 
buyers. The results remain signiﬁcant after controlling for 
the socioeconomic characteristics of buyers, and agents 
pay 2.45% lower for their own houses than comparable 
houses bought by others. We include the district by year 
10 We also conduct a similar analysis of the seller-side activities of 
real estate agents as in Levitt and Syverson (2008) and Rutherford et al. 
(2005) , and we have not found that real estate agents obtain higher prices 
when selling their own houses compared to others’ houses. 
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Panel A: Agent’s discount on total price over month
Panel B: Proportion of agent’s transaction over months
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Fig. 3. Agent’s transactions by month. This ﬁgure shows the agent discount over months and the proportion of agent transactions over months. 
ﬁxed effects in Columns 3 and 4 to rule out the con- 
cern that agent may selectively time the market and favor 
particular locations in their purchases, and the results are 
consistent. 
One potential concern is that our data set includes 
only agents listed on the CEA website as of May 2014. 
Some nonagent buyers may potentially be misclassiﬁed as 
agent buyers if they become agents after they bought their 
houses. Similarly, some agent buyers may also be misclas- 
siﬁed as nonagent buyers if they quit their agent jobs after 
they bought their houses. These misclassiﬁcations, if they 
exist, are expected to bias our results toward zero. Thus, 
the agent discounts are likely to be the lower bound of our 
estimation. 
We conduct further robustness checks on the results. 
First, we test whether our results are driven by agents’ 
selection on unobserved quality of houses. We use the 
subsample (b) that includes only 2874 houses that expe- 
rienced more than one sale, one of which involved agent 
buyers. We add the house ﬁxed effects to control for 
unobserved quality of houses. Based on the same rationale 
of the repeated sale methodology, we compare differences 
in sale prices while keeping the quality of houses constant 
by using sample houses that sold twice or more, once 
to an agent buyer. Despite a smaller sample of repeated 
sales used in the estimation, the results show that the 
coeﬃcient on the agent dummy is −1.52% (Columns 5), 
and the coeﬃcient is −1.48% (Column 6) when the so- 
cioeconomic characteristics of buyers are controlled for. 
The results imply that for repeated transactions-one by 
an agent buyer and another one by a nonagent buyer-we 
expect agents to pay a lower price when buying the house 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics. 
This table presents the aggregate-level summary statistics of our data set before and after propensity score matching. The full sample includes 
108,534 property transactions of condominium and apartment in Singapore from 1995 to 2012. Propensity score matching are one-to-one match 
by setting agent as treatment group based on the property information, transaction year, location of property (district level), and other buyer char- 
acteristics. Panel A reports the summary statistics for the full sample, and Panel B reports the summary statistics for propensity score matched 
sample. “Price” is the unit sale price in Singapore dollars per square meter. “Total amount” is the total transaction amount in Singapore dollars. 
“Size” is the transacted property size in square meters. “Floor” is the ﬂoor level of the property. “Condominium” has a value of one, if a con- 
dominium is purchased, and zero otherwise indicates an apartment. “Freehold” has a value of one, if a house has a freehold tenure, and zero 
otherwise. “Newsale” represents houses sold by developers in the primary market. “Resale” represents houses sold in the secondary market. “Male”
has a value of one for a male buyer, and zero otherwise for a female buyer. “Chinese” identiﬁes Chinese buyers, and zero otherwise identiﬁes other 
races (Malay, India, and others). “Marriage” has a value of one for a married buyer, and zero otherwise. “Age” measures the buyer’s age. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and 
∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Sample Total Agent buyer Nonagent buyer Diff
Panel A: original sample 
Price (Singapore dollars per square meter) 8245.5800 8127.0 0 0 0 8252.2400 125.24 ∗∗∗
Total amount 970,032.94 904,777.55 973,700.25 68,922.7 ∗∗∗
Size (square meters) 120.2209 116.5815 120.4254 3.8439 ∗∗∗
Floor 0.7203 0.7108 0.7208 0.0100 ∗∗
Condominium 0.8869 0.8860 0.8869 0.0 0 09 
Freehold 0.4359 0.3952 0.4382 0.0430 
Newsale 0.5407 0.5051 0.5427 0.0376 
Resale 0.3791 0.4059 0.3776 −0.0283 
Male 0.6154 0.5302 0.6202 0.0900 ∗∗∗
Chinese 0.9391 0.9635 0.9377 −0.0258 ∗∗∗
Marriage 0.5987 0.6536 0.5957 −0.0579 ∗∗∗
Age 43.2279 40.3205 43.3915 3.0710 ∗∗∗
Total observation 108,534 5775 102,759 
Panel B: propensity score matched sample 
Price (Singapore dollars per square meter) 8190.4800 8122.9900 8257.9700 134.9800 ∗
Total amount 909,842.9 904,422.06 915,263.75 10,841.69 
Size (square meters) 115.6771 116.6108 114.7434 −1.8674 ∗∗∗
Floor 0.7143 0.7109 0.7176 0.0067 
Condominium 0.8935 0.8856 0.9015 0.1590 ∗∗
Freehold 0.3917 0.3950 0.3884 −0.0066 
Newsale 0.5113 0.5052 0.5175 0.0123 
Resale 0.4024 0.4066 0.3982 −0.0084 
Male 0.5304 0.5306 0.5303 −0.0 0 03 
Chinese 0.9634 0.9637 0.9632 −0.0 0 05 
Marriage 0.6556 0.6536 0.6576 0.0040 
Age 40.3698 40.3577 40.3819 0.0242 ∗∗∗
Total observations 11,402 5701 5701 
for their own use compared to buying the same house for 
clients (other buyers). 
In the second robustness test, we test whether our re- 
sults are inﬂuenced by unbalanced samples in the treat- 
ment group and the control group. Based on the buyers’ 
loading factors estimated by the PSM technique, we match 
the housing samples in the treatment group one-on-one 
onto the control group. We rerun the log-housing price 
models using the matched samples. The results in Columns 
7 and 8 of Table 2 show that agents pay 2.38% lower 
for houses bought for their own use compared to similar 
houses bought by other nonagent buyers. The price dis- 
count for agents’ houses relative to nonagents’ houses is 
still 2.32% after controlling for the buyers’ characteristics. 
The ﬁndings in Table 2 are generally robust and con- 
sistent; agents buy their own houses at lower prices than 
those of comparable houses bought by other buyers. We 
test the robustness in the process of merging the agent 
data set and the transaction data set in Online Appendix 
A. 
We analyze the heterogeneous effects by sale type and 
size of agency companies in Online Appendix B. The results 
in Table A2 show signiﬁcant discounts for houses sold to 
the agent buyers in both the resale and the new sale mar- 
kets. In the resale market, agent buyers pay 2.56% (Col- 
umn 1) lower in prices than other buyers for compara- 
ble houses, and the price discount is 2.48% (Column 2) af- 
ter controlling for the buyers’ characteristics in the model. 
However, in the new sale market, the discounts for agent 
buyers are still signiﬁcant, but the magnitude is smaller at 
2.57% (Column 3) and 2.41% (Column 4) after controlling 
for the buyers’ socioeconomic characteristics. We ﬁnd that 
freehold houses are valued 11% to 15% more than other 
identical leasehold houses, which is consistent with the 
ﬁndings in Giglio et al. (2015) . 
Does the agent discount change over time? Using the 
establishment of the CEA in October 2010 as an exogenous 
shock, we conduct a quasi-experiment to test whether the 
establishment of the CEA could eliminate agent discounts. 
The CEA, as the industry watchdog, has the regulatory 
power to discipline and monitor the behavior of agents as 
well as to protect buyers from being taken advantage of 
by agents in the housing markets. The CEA disallows dual 
representation by an agent to prevent conﬂicts of interests 
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Table 2 
Information advantages of real estate agents. 
This table shows results of OLS regression analysis. The dependent variable is log-total price of houses. “Agent” is a dummy variable that has a value 
of one, if a buyer is also an agent, and zero otherwise. The control variables in the model include unit size (sqm), a dummy on condominium, a 
dummy on high ﬂoor that identiﬁes unit located at level nine and above, and a dummy on new sale and a dummy on resale. Models in Column 
2, 4, 6, and 8 also control for socioeconomic variations using the buyer characteristics, such as dummies on “Male,” “Chinese,” and “Marriage.” For 
age, we use a dummy on “Old age” that takes a value of one, if a buyer is 60 year and older, and zero otherwise. The district ﬁxed effect, which is 
represented by the 28 planning districts, and the transaction year ﬁxed effects are included in the regression. Regression results in Columns 1, 2, 3, 
and 4 are estimated using the full sample observations. Columns 5 and 6 are estimated using repeated sale samples, i.e., houses sold more than one 
time during the sample period, and where one of the buyer was an agent. For Columns 5 and 6, housing ﬁxed effects are included. Columns 7 and 8 
are estimated based on matched samples generated using the propensity score matching approach. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ , 
∗∗ , and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Sample All samples Repeat sale Matched sample 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Agent −0.0254 ∗∗∗ −0.0245 ∗∗∗ −0.0240 ∗∗∗ −0.0231 ∗∗∗ −0.0152 ∗∗∗ −0.0148 ∗∗∗ −0.0238 ∗∗∗ −0.0232 ∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0049) (0.0052) (0.0041) (0.0041) 
Size (square meters) 0.0055 ∗∗∗ 0.0055 ∗∗∗ 0.0055 ∗∗∗ 0.0055 ∗∗∗ 0.0061 ∗∗∗ 0.0061 ∗∗∗
(0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 01) (0.0 0 01) 
Condominium 0.1546 ∗∗∗ 0.1548 ∗∗∗ 0.1532 ∗∗∗ 0.1532 ∗∗∗ 0.1550 ∗∗∗ 0.1541 ∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0055) (0.0055) 
High ﬂoor 0.0404 ∗∗∗ 0.0403 ∗∗∗ 0.0383 ∗∗∗ 0.0383 ∗∗∗ 0.0421 ∗∗∗ 0.0420 ∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0044) (0.0044) 
Freehold 0.1217 ∗∗∗ 0.1215 ∗∗∗ 0.1234 ∗∗∗ 0.1232 ∗∗∗ 0.1113 ∗∗∗ 0.1107 ∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0054) (0.0054) 
Newsale 0.0129 ∗∗∗ 0.0123 ∗∗∗ 0.0249 ∗∗∗ 0.0244 ∗∗∗ −0.0264 ∗∗∗ −0.0272 ∗∗∗ 0.0057 0.0054 
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0103) (0.0105) (0.0079) (0.0079) 
Resale −0.1785 ∗∗∗ −0.1787 ∗∗∗ −0.1590 ∗∗∗ −0.1593 ∗∗∗ −0.0529 ∗∗∗ −0.0560 ∗∗∗ −0.1733 ∗∗∗ −0.1729 ∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0129) (0.0131) (0.0081) (0.0081) 
Intercept 13.0899 ∗∗∗ 13.0755 ∗∗∗ 12.9117 ∗∗∗ 12.9031 ∗∗∗ 14.5393 ∗∗∗ 14.5600 ∗∗∗ 13.0082 ∗∗∗ 12.9805 ∗∗∗
(0.0129) (0.0133) (0.1287) (0.1287) (0.0991) (0.1008) (0.0363) (0.0380) 
Socioeconomic variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Time ﬁxed effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District ﬁxed effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District-year ﬁxed effects No No Yes Yes No No No No 
House ﬁxed effects No No No No Yes Yes No No 
Observations 108,534 107,399 108,534 107,399 2874 2831 11,402 11,402 
R -squared 0.7743 0.7746 0.7950 0.7952 0.9535 0.9541 0.7732 0.7739 
that may arise when an agent concurrently represents a 
buyer and a seller in a deal. If the CEA is an effective reg- 
ulator, we should expect discounts in agent buyers’ hous- 
ing purchases to decline, if not fully disappear, after the 
policy shocks. We run the experiment in the difference-in- 
differences (diff-in-diff) model below: 
ln 
(
P i , d , t 
)
= α + β × Agen t it + φ × ( AfterCEA × Agent ) 
+ γX i + μd + ϕ t + ε itd , (2) 
We include an interaction term, Agent x AfterCEA, 
where AfterCEA is a time dummy that indicates the post- 
CEA regime in the above diff-in-diff speciﬁcation. If the in- 
teractive term is positive and signiﬁcant, we could argue 
that the new CEA regulatory regime has effectively cur- 
tailed the effects of agents’ exploitation of information ad- 
vantages to pay lower prices in their housing purchases. 
The results in Table 3 show that agents’ information 
advantages are economically and statistically signiﬁcant, 
and the discounts in agent buyers’ own housing purchases 
are estimated at approximately 2.66% (Column 1) and 
2.55% (Column 2) relative to the houses bought by other 
nonagent buyers. The coeﬃcients on the interactive term, 
Agent ×AfterCEA, are positive at 1.73% and 1.60%, respec- 
tively, but statistically insigniﬁcant in both models. The 
CEA’s effect is large, which is reﬂected in 70% decreases 
in agent discounts from the discounts before the CEA’s 
establishment. The large standard error is likely due to 
the sample limitation because we only have two years of 
housing data after the CEA’s establishment. The agent dis- 
counts are estimated at 0.93% ( = 2.66% −1.73%) and 0.95% 
( = 2.55% −1.6%), respectively, after the CEA’s establishment. 
We could not reject the hypothesis that the agent dis- 
count is zero in the post-CEA regime. Despite the sam- 
ple limitation, the results still show strong treatment ef- 
fects after the new regulatory regime under the CEA, 
where decreases in price discounts (information advan- 
tages) for agents were observed in the post-CEA period. 
The results imply that unethical practices by agents, which 
may include dual representation and information shroud- 
ing, could have had been largely curtailed after the CEA 
regulatory regime. Agents are no longer able to exploit in- 
formation advantages to buy their own houses at lower 
prices compared to comparable houses purchased by nona- 
gent buyers. 
We test the treatment effects using housing transac- 
tions that occur during the period between 2005 and 2012, 
which is close to the CEA’s establishment period in Octo- 
ber 2010. The results in Column 3 are robust and consis- 
tent with the early results in the full sample. In Columns 
4 and 5, we test the impact of CEA using the new sale and 
the resale data. The results are robust and consistent with 
the early results in the full sample. 
We estimate the average price discounts for houses 
bought by agent buyers and plot the coeﬃcients of agent 
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Table 3 
Effects of the new regulatory regime. 
This table shows results of OLS regression analysis. The dependent variable is log-total price of houses. 
“AfterCEA” is a time dummy that represents the establishment of Council for Estate Agencies (CEA) on 
22 October 2010, and it has a value of one, if a transaction occurs on and after 22 October 2010, and 
zero otherwise. “Agent” is a dummy variable that has a value of one, if a buyer is also an agent, and 
zero otherwise. The control variables in the model include unit size (sqm), a dummy on condominium. 
Socioeconomic variations are controlled in Columns 2-5 using the buyer characteristics, such as dummies 
on “Male,” “Chinese,” and “Marriage.” For age, we use a dummy on “Old age” that takes a value of one, 
if a buyer is 60 year and older, and zero otherwise. The spatial ﬁxed effect, which is represented by the 
28 planning districts, and the transaction year ﬁxed effects are included in the regression. Regression 
results in Columns 1 and 2 are estimated using the full samples, whereas Columns 3 is estimated using 
subsamples periods 2005-2012. Column 4 and 5 are estimated using subsamples of new sale and resale. 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
Sample Full samples 2005 - 2012 Newsale Resale 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Agent −0.0266 ∗∗∗ −0.0255 ∗∗∗ −0.0319 ∗∗∗ −0.0230 ∗∗∗ −0.0264 ∗∗∗
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0045) (0.0040) (0.0055) 
Agent ×AfterCEA 0.0173 0.0160 0.0203 −0.0431 ∗ 0.0145 
(0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0137) (0.0244) (0.0164) 
Size 0.0055 ∗∗∗ 0.0055 ∗∗∗ 0.0059 ∗∗∗ 0.0069 ∗∗∗ 0.0042 ∗∗∗
(0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) 
Condominium 0.1546 ∗∗∗ 0.1548 ∗∗∗ 0.1506 ∗∗∗ 0.0934 ∗∗∗ 0.2127 ∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0031) 
High ﬂoor 0.0404 ∗∗∗ 0.0403 ∗∗∗ 0.0537 ∗∗∗ 0.0396 ∗∗∗ 0.0389 ∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0026) 
Freehold 0.1217 ∗∗∗ 0.1215 ∗∗∗ 0.0808 ∗∗∗ 0.1088 ∗∗∗ 0.1451 ∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0030) 
Newsale 0.0129 ∗∗∗ 0.0122 ∗∗∗ 0.0413 ∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0035) 
Resale −0.1786 ∗∗∗ −0.1787 ∗∗∗ −0.1611 ∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0036) 
Intercept 13.0893 ∗∗∗ 13.0750 ∗∗∗ 13.0068 ∗∗∗ 12.9963 ∗∗∗ 13.1183 ∗∗∗
(0.0129) (0.0133) (0.0162) (0.0227) (0.0181) 
Socioeconomic variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Spatial ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 108,534 107,399 63,580 58,071 40,737 
R -squared 0.7743 0.7746 0.7759 0.8148 0.7572 
discounts from 2005 to 2012 in a half-year interval in 
Fig. 4 . We ﬁnd that agent buyers buy houses at discounted 
prices in 12 out of the 13 half-year periods before the 
establishment of the CEA; the coeﬃcients are all statisti- 
cally signiﬁcant. The only exception is in the second half 
of 2008, which was the year after the US ﬁnancial cri- 
sis. The agent discounts is estimated at approximately 3% 
over time, which reﬂects the common trend before the 
CEA regime. For the three half-year periods after the es- 
tablishment of the CEA, the coeﬃcients are close to zero 
but statistically insigniﬁcant. The results indicate that there 
is a pre-trend before the establishment of the CEA, and 
the post-CEA trend shows a signiﬁcant decline in the agent 
discounts. 
We run additional diagnostic tests by using the placebo 
cutoff dates to mimic the treatment effects of the CEA’s 
establishment. We use different arbitrary treatment years 
to systematically represent the placebo policy changes be- 
tween 2004 and 2009. For each of the placebo policy 
year tests, we keep a balance sample size by keeping 
the same three-year window both before and after the 
placebo policy year. We run the tests using the six-year 
rolling window; for example, in the 2004 placebo year, 
the samples used in the estimation span from 2001 to 
2006. Table A4 shows only the results of the treatment 
effects (Agent ×Placebo cutoff year); the coeﬃcients for 
other variables are omitted due to the space constraints. 
We ﬁnd that except for the year 2005 (Column 2), the 
coeﬃcients on the interaction terms are negative, though 
they are insigniﬁcant in the four placebo years from 2004 
to 2007. However, when we set the placebo cutoff years in 
20 08 and 20 09, which are closer to the actual treatment 
year in 2010, the coeﬃcients on the Agent ×Placebo cut- 
off year become positive but are still statistically insigniﬁ- 
cant. The switch in the coeﬃcient signs from negatives in 
the placebo years from 2004 to 2007 to positives in the 
placebo years 2008 and 2009 implies that the treatment 
effects could not be falsiﬁed in the placebo controlled tests. 
The results show that agents are no longer able to buy 
houses for their own use at prices that are lower than 
those paid by other clients following the implementation 
of regulatory controls in the post-CEA regime. However, we 
could not rule out one possible confounder associated with 
the use of online and web-based search and listing services 
that have gained popularity in Singapore after 2007. Tech- 
nologies could reduce search costs and diminish informa- 
tion advantages of real estate agents in the housing mar- 
kets. However, the results in the placebo tests in Column 3, 
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Fig. 4. Agent discount over years. This ﬁgure shows the agent discount over time. 
Table A4 show that the coeﬃcients on Agent ×Placebo cut- 
off year is negative, and in Column 4, the coeﬃcient is pos- 
itive and larger than one percentage point. The results sug- 
gest that the shock occurred in approximately 2010, rather 
than in 2007, which means that technological changes are 
unlikely to explain our results. 
4.2. Possible explanations 
4.2.1. Information asymmetries 
Why do real estate agents pay lower prices when 
buying their own houses, as shown by the early empir- 
ical evidence? Our result is consistent with information 
asymmetries in the housing market: real estate agents 
have information advantage over less-informed nonagent 
buyers. In this section, we provide more evidence to 
support the predictions of the existing literature regarding 
information asymmetries. 
If agent’s price discount is due to information asym- 
metry, agent buyers should have more information advan- 
tage in a less informative environment. There are several 
ways to identify information asymmetries in the literature. 
Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004) argue that a high varia- 
tion in the property tax assessment ratio suggests that the 
assessment is less informative and information asymme- 
tries are prevalent in a jurisdiction. By contrast, Levitt and 
Syverson (2008) argue that information asymmetries in an 
area are correlated with the heterogeneity in house types 
within a block. However, we cannot directly apply their 
empirical strategies to test information asymmetries in our 
context because appraisals for residential houses are not 
public information, and housing types are rather homoge- 
nous in each building in Singapore’s non-landed housing 
markets. Instead, we propose to use the variance in trans- 
action prices in a building to proxy the information asym- 
metries in Singapore’s housing market. In this market, in- 
formation asymmetries increase with the variance in hous- 
ing prices. In a building with high price variance, housing 
information is dispersed and less useful for nonagent buy- 
ers. Agent buyers could exploit their information advan- 
tages over uninformed buyers to buy houses for their own 
occupation at discounts in a relatively less informative en- 
vironment. Thus, we hypothesize that agent discounts are 
positively correlated with the variance in transaction prices 
in a building. 
In Column 1 of Table 4 , we deﬁne an environment to be 
highly heterogeneous and informationally less transparent 
if the variance in transaction prices is above the median 
price variance in our sample (Heterogeneity ≥50%). We 
show that in a transparent market (in buildings with rela- 
tively low variance in housing prices), agent buyers obtain 
a 1.6% discount for their own housing purchases relative 
to houses purchased by nonagent buyers. However, in a 
highly heterogeneous environment with high price vari- 
ance in the buildings, agent buyers obtain larger discounts 
of 3.1% in their housing purchases relative to nonagents’ 
housing purchases. In Column 2, based on the variance in 
transaction prices, we divide the information asymmetries 
of the housing market into three quantiles: High hetero- 
geneity, Median heterogeneity, and Low heterogeneity, and 
then rerun the models. The results indicate that agent 
buyers buy houses at 1.3% discounts in the lower third 
quantile of the building sample by the price variance 
(heterogeneity). In the upper third quantile of buildings 
(by the price variance) (High heterogeneity), where prices 
are more heterogeneous, agent buyers obtain a larger dis- 
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Table 4 
Heterogeneity across real estate agent. 
This table shows results of OLS regression analysis. The dependent variable is log-total price of 
houses. “Agent” is a dummy variable that has a value of one, if a buyer is also an agent, and zero 
otherwise. “High heterogeneity (50%)” is a dummy variable that has a value of one if the building in 
the upper half of our sample in terms of information environment heterogeneity. “High heterogene- 
ity” is a dummy variable that has a value of one if the building in the upper third of our sample 
in terms of information environment heterogeneity. “Median heterogeneity” is a dummy variable 
that has a value of one if the building in the middle third of our sample in terms of information 
environment heterogeneity. “Agent with high performance1” is a dummy variable that has a value 
of one if agent buyer’s performance is above the median performance in our listing sample. “Agent 
with low performance1” is a dummy variable that has a value of one if agent buyer’s performance 
is below the median performance in our listing sample. “Agent with unknown performance1” is a 
dummy variable that has a value of one if agent buyer’s performance is not shown in our listing 
data. “Agent with high performance2” is a dummy variable that has a value of one if agent buyer’s 
performance is above the median performance in our transacted sample. “Agent with low perfor- 
mance2” is a dummy variable that has a value of one if agent buyer’s performance is below the 
median performance in our transacted sample. “Agent with unknown performance2” is a dummy 
variable that has a value of one if agent buyer’s performance is not shown in our transacted data. 
The control variables in the model include housing variables using the house characteristics and so- 
cioeconomic variations using the buyer characteristics. The spatial ﬁxed effect, which is represented 
by the 28 planning districts, and the transaction year ﬁxed effects are included in the regression. 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
Sample All samples 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Agent −0.0160 ∗∗∗ −0.0134 ∗
(0.0049) (0.0069) 
Agent ∗High heterogeneity (50%) −0.0150 ∗∗
(0.0064) 
Agent ∗High heterogeneity −0.0271 ∗∗∗
(0.0086) 
Agent ∗Median heterogeneity −0.0025 
(0.0085) 
Agent with high performance1 −0.0299 ∗∗∗
(0.0050) 
Agent with low performance1 −0.0199 ∗∗∗
(0.0050) 
Agent with unknown performance1 −0.0236 ∗∗∗
(0.0064) 
Agent with high performance2 −0.0304 ∗∗∗
(0.0051) 
Agent with low performance2 −0.0194 ∗∗∗
(0.0050) 
Agent with unknown performance2 −0.0236 ∗∗∗
(0.0064) 
Intercept 13.0751 ∗∗∗ 13.0650 ∗∗∗ 13.0758 ∗∗∗ 13.0754 ∗∗∗
(0.0133) (0.0132) (0.0133) (0.0133) 
Socioeconomic variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Housing variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 107,399 107,399 107,399 107,399 
R -squared 0.7749 0.7773 0.7746 0.7746 
count of 4.1% for their houses compared to houses bought 
by nonagent buyers. The results are consistent with the 
predictions of information asymmetries by Garmaise and 
Moskowitz (2004) and Levitt and Syverson (2008) . 
Next, we merge approximately 40% of the resale trans- 
action from 2010 to 2012 to the listing data and create 
three indicators on agents’ performance (Performance1) 
based on the number of houses he/she represents in the 
listings over a year: high performance, low performance, 
and unknown performance. The high performing agent 
is an agent whose listing performance is above the me- 
dian listing number in the sample. We then explore the 
relationships between agent performance and the hous- 
ing price. In Column 3, we ﬁnd that the high performing 
agents enjoy larger discounts of 3.0%, while the low per- 
forming agents enjoy signiﬁcant, but smaller, discounts of 
2.0% when they buy their own houses relative to houses 
bought by nonagent buyers. Similarly, using the number 
of sales an agent has closed in the transaction data, we 
calculate the comparable performance indicators, (Perfor- 
mance2) and rerun the log-total housing price models. The 
results, as shown in Column 4, are consistent with those 
discussed in Column 3. The results are consistent with the 
information asymmetry hypothesis, which indicates that 
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Table 5 
Sorting among real estate agent. 
This table shows results of OLS regression analysis. The 
dependent variable is a binary variable has a value of 
one, if a buyer is an agent. “Agent seller” is a dummy 
variable that has a value of one, if a seller is also 
an agent, and zero otherwise. The control variables in 
the model include housing variables using the house 
characteristics and socioeconomic variations using the 
buyer characteristics. The spatial ﬁxed effect, which is 
represented by the 28 planning districts, and the trans- 
action year ﬁxed effects are included in the regression. 
∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
Sample All samples 
Model (1) (2) 
Agent seller 0.0293 ∗∗∗ 0.0303 ∗∗∗
(0.0058) (0.0058) 
Intercept 0.0669 ∗∗∗ 0.0721 ∗∗∗
(0.0178) (0.0187) 
Socioeconomic variables No Yes 
Housing variables Yes Yes 
Time ﬁxed effects Yes Yes 
District ﬁxed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 27,119 23,985 
R -squared 0.0042 0.0044 
high performing agents with stronger information advan- 
tage enjoy signiﬁcantly larger discounts when they buy 
their own houses. 
Using professional brokers as an indicator of infor- 
mation asymmetries in commercial real estate market, 
Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004) show that nonagent sell- 
ers (nonagent buyers) are unwilling to trade with more in- 
formed agent buyers (agent sellers). In equilibrium, market 
segmentation exists such that agent sellers will only sell 
their houses to agent buyers. We test this prediction using 
the binary buyer variable as the dependent variable in the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions, and we summa- 
rize these results in Table 5 . The coeﬃcients on the agent 
seller dummy is positive and signiﬁcant after controlling 
for socioeconomic factors, housing attributes, time ﬁxed ef- 
fects, and district ﬁxed effects. The results imply that agent 
sellers are more likely to sell their houses to agent buy- 
ers, which is consistent with the results in Garmaise and 
Moskowitz (2004) . 
In summary, we show that agent buyers buy houses 
at signiﬁcant discounts because agent buyers have in- 
formation advantages in a less informative environment, 
and that high performing agent buyers have a relatively 
stronger information advantage. We also show that agent 
buyers are more likely to trade with agent sellers. All the 
above results are consistent with the predictions of infor- 
mation asymmetries. 
4.2.2. Alternative explanations 
Agents engaging in ﬂipping activities are likely to buy 
and sell houses quickly for proﬁts in the market, and the 
ﬂipping motive offers an alternative explanation to agents’ 
buying a house for their own use. If the ﬂipping story 
holds, we should expect agents to buy houses at dis- 
counted prices and sell them in a short time to realize 
investment gains. These ﬂipping activities could result in 
a large volume of selling activities by agents. However, 
we ﬁnd no evidence to suggest that ﬂipping is the main 
story driving our results. First, we ﬁnd that agents’ hous- 
ing sales (repeat sales) constitute only 8.1% of the housing 
sales in the market. Second, we show that the establish- 
ment of the CEA as the industry watchdog in 2010 reduces 
the agent discounts ( Table 3 ). If the agent discounts are 
due to agents’ picking and buying low quality houses to 
ﬂip, we should not observe exogenous shocks associated 
with the CEA’s presence, and the agents’ discounts should 
persist before and after the CEA’s establishment. Third, us- 
ing the home addresses of agents, we sort an agent buyer 
into the owner occupier group if his/her current home ad- 
dress is the same as the transacted house address; other- 
wise, the agent buyer is identiﬁed as an Investors. We de- 
ﬁne an Investor dummy with a value of one if an agent is 
an investor and zero if he/she is an owner occupier; we 
also include an interactive term (Agent × Investor) in the 
log-unit housing price models. 
The results as in Table A8 (Online Appendix) show 
that agent-investors enjoy larger discounts than agent buy- 
ers, who buy houses for their own occupation purposes. 
We ﬁnd that agent buyers generally pay a 2.5% lower in 
price for comparable houses compared to other nonagent 
buyers. However, the coeﬃcients on the interactive term 
Agent × Investor are not signiﬁcant. The results show that 
agent-investors do not enjoy larger discounts than other 
agent buyers, who are owner occupiers. We ﬁnd no evi- 
dence to support the ﬂipping as the reason for the price 
discounts in agent buyers’ transactions. 
An alternative explanation to the agent discounts is that 
agents time the market to earn price discounts when buy- 
ing houses for their own use. The market timing story, if 
not rejected, implies that agents’ transactions are expected 
to cluster around a speciﬁc time of a year during which 
agents can enjoy large discounts when buying houses. The 
following evidence suggests that the market timing story 
may drive the agents’ information advantage story in our 
study. First, we include the year-month ﬁxed effects in 
Eq. (1) and run the same regression as in Table 2 (Columns 
1 and 2). We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients are estimated at 
−0.0255 and −0.0246, respectively, and both are signiﬁ- 
cant at the 1% level. The results are very close to the coef- 
ﬁcients reported in Table 2 . Second, Fig. 3 , Panel B shows 
that the fractions of agents’ housing transactions are dis- 
tributed within a narrow range of between 5% and 5.6% 
across 12 months in a year. Bunching of the agent trans- 
actions is not evidenced in the data, and the differences 
in the fraction of agent transactions by month are not sig- 
niﬁcant ( p = 0.71). We explore the month effects in agent 
discounts by interacting the agent indicator with various 
time-related indicators, which include the month of the 
year, the quarter of the year, the three-month Singapore 
Interbank Offered Rates (SIBOR), and the housing price in- 
dex (Table A5). 11 
The agent discounts could be explained by the bundling 
of sellers’ furniture and appliances into a house when the 
11 Three-month SIBOR is usually the index rate for home mortgages in 
Singapore. We use the price index of non-landed properties from the Ur- 
ban Redevelopment Authority (URA) as our housing price index. 
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parties negotiate on the housing sales. Except for a few 
special cases in which developers sell their “show-ﬂats”12 
in a bundle in new projects, the bundling practice is un- 
common in the sales by individual sellers. In Singapore’s 
context, houses are immovables, also legally known as re- 
alty or chattels real, which include, other than the land 
and building structure sitting thereon, ﬁxtures that are an- 
nexed to the building and land. Furniture, appliances, and 
other tangible items (not permanently ﬁxed to land) that 
are not classiﬁed as immovables will not be passed on to 
buyers unless otherwise agreed upon. In most instances, 
buyers will take possession of vacant houses without en- 
cumbrance upon sales; movables, such as furniture and ap- 
pliances, are not bundled in most of the housing transac- 
tions in Singapore. Thus, it is unlikely that the bundling of 
movables could explain the agents’ price discounts in our 
results. 
4.3. Source of information advantage: evidence from sellers’ 
characteristics 
What are the possible mechanisms through which real 
estate agents could exploit information advantages to gain 
economic beneﬁts in housing transactions? In this sec- 
tion, we investigate the sources of information advantages 
through the interactions between agent buyers’ and agent 
sellers’ characteristics. There are two possible sources of 
information advantages: the extensive margin and the in- 
tensive margin. On the extensive margin, agents are more 
likely to use their information advantages to select weak 
sellers who are ﬁnancially distressed. This selection chan- 
nel is supported if real estate agents show a strong pref- 
erence for buying houses from a selected group of buyers, 
such as uninformed individuals and/or buyers, who are ﬁ- 
nancially distressed. On the intensive margin, agents might 
use information advantages to tilt their bargaining power 
when negotiating against weak sellers. If the bargaining 
power channel is not rejected, we expect real estate agents 
to pay lower prices when buying houses from individual 
sellers, and in contrast, the discounts are smaller when 
buying houses from more informed sellers. Agents exploit 
their information advantages to bargain down prices when 
dealing with buyers in “ﬁre sales.”
4.3.1. Extensive margin: agents’ selection of weak sellers 
To test whether real estate agents use information ad- 
vantages on the extensive margin to cherry pick weak sell- 
ers in the market, we use two types of weak sellers: indi- 
vidual sellers and sellers involved in lawsuits. We test the 
housing price effects on the group of weak sellers against 
two other groups of sellers who are investors and institu- 
tions. Individual sellers are identiﬁed as owner occupiers 
12 In the precompletion sales by developers, show-ﬂats, which are ei- 
ther units in a new project or temporary units built on the site, are ﬂats 
that developers will outﬁt with interior ﬁnishes, furniture, and appliances, 
as part of developers’ marketing strategy to attract potential buyers. The 
show-ﬂats mimic the layout of the units launched for sales in precomple- 
tion development. For show-ﬂats created in real ﬂats in a project, devel- 
opers could sell the units together with the ﬁxtures and furniture, but at 
discounted costs, to interested buyers after the completion of the sales of 
the project. 
and live in the houses with the same addresses as the 
transacted houses. Investor sellers are those whose current 
home addresses are different from the addresses of trans- 
acted houses. Institutional sellers are ﬁrms (including de- 
velopers) that sell houses in the resale markets. We use 
only transactions in the resale market; developers’ sales in 
the primary market are excluded in the tests. 
Compared to investor sellers, individual sellers face 
pressure to sell their houses quickly before moving into 
their new houses. Similarly, sellers who are involved in 
lawsuits are under ﬁnancial pressure to sell their houses in 
a shorter time and at ﬁre sale prices. We derive four binary 
seller dummy variables—k i = (individuals, investors, institu- 
tions and sellers involved in lawsuits)—which have a value 
of either zero or one, to represent the four groups of sellers 
and use the seller dummy (k i ) as the dependent variables 
in the following OLS regression controlling for the district 
and the time ﬁxed effects: 
k i = α + β × Agen t it + γX i + μd + ϕ t + ε itd , (3) 
We exclude developers’ sales from the sample when es- 
timating the sellers’ selection models of Eq. (3) . The OLS 
results with the three different binary seller variables as 
dependent variables are summarized in Column 1 to Col- 
umn 3 of Table 6 . The results show that the coeﬃcients on 
the Agent dummy are positive but insigniﬁcant in the indi- 
viduals (Column 1) and investors (Column 2) models. The 
95% conﬁdence interval of the coeﬃcient in Column 1 is 
[ −0.5%, 4.8%]. The coeﬃcient is negative but insigniﬁcant 
in the institutions model (Column 3). The results show 
that agents are more likely to buy houses from individ- 
ual sellers and investors and are less likely to buy houses 
from ﬁrms. However, the selection channel is not statisti- 
cally signiﬁcant in the models. 13 Therefore, the hypothe- 
sis that agent buyers’ use information advantages to self- 
select houses when buying their own houses is not sup- 
ported. 
We conduct further tests on the cherry picking chan- 
nel using a new proxy for the weak sellers in Column 4. In 
this model, sellers are involved in lawsuits, and this group 
of sellers is under the time pressure to quickly sell their 
houses. By merging the law event data set into the housing 
transaction data set, we identify sellers who are involved 
in various lawsuits, which include bankruptcy, car accident, 
sales of goods, credit card, and tenancy disputes. We sort 
this group of sellers into the treatment group and identi- 
ﬁed them by a lawsuits dummy, which has a value of one 
if a seller is involved in one of these law events, and zero 
otherwise. 14 The results show that the coeﬃcients on the 
13 When we exclude institutions sellers from the samples, the coeﬃcient 
on the Agent variables is still not signiﬁcant. We ﬁnd no evidence to sug- 
gest that real estate agents cherry pick a speciﬁc group of buyers when 
buying their own houses. 
14 We also use the ﬁve different indicators to separately identify the law 
events, ( ιi ), and substitute the seller indicators (k i ) in Eq. (3) by the new 
set of lawsuit indicators for the sellers, ( ιi ), to test if agents’ selection for a 
particular group of sellers is observed. The results are consistent when we 
split the law events into different categories. The results do not support 
the cherry picking story that agents are expected to exploit information 
advantages to buy their own houses from sellers involved in different law 
events. 
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Table 6 
Agents’ selection on weak sellers. 
This table shows results of OLS regression analysis using only the resale samples. The dependent variables in Columns 1 to 4 are represented by four 
binary variables that represent different sellers, such as individuals, investors, institutions, and sellers involved in lawsuits. The binary variable has a 
value of one, if a seller type is as deﬁned in the top row of the table. The dependent variable in Columns 5 to 8 is log-total price of houses. “Weak 
seller” is a dummy variable that has a value of one if the seller is involved in lawsuits (Column 5 and 6) or is an individual seller (Column 7 to 8). 
“Agent” is a dummy variable that has a value of one, if a buyer is also an agent, and zero otherwise. The control variables in the model include housing 
variables using the house characteristics and socioeconomic variations using the buyer characteristics. The spatial ﬁxed effect, which is represented by 
the 28 planning districts, and the transaction year ﬁxed effects are included in the regression. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗
indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable Weak seller Log(total transaction price) 
Types of seller Individual seller Investor seller Institutional seller Seller involved in lawsuits Seller involved in lawsuits Individual seller 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Weak seller −0.0350 ∗∗∗ −0.0350 ∗∗∗ −0.0957 ∗∗∗ −0.0955 ∗∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0040) (0.0040) 
Agent 0.0215 −0.0085 −0.0130 0.0049 −0.0246 ∗∗∗ −0.0248 ∗∗∗
(0.0137) (0.0066) (0.0127) (0.0055) (0.0052) (0.0073) 
Intercept 0.8255 ∗∗∗ 0.0800 ∗∗∗ 0.0944 ∗∗ 0.0794 ∗∗∗ 13.1203 ∗∗∗ 13.1218 ∗∗∗ 13.1684 ∗∗∗ 13.1707 ∗∗∗
(0.0453) (0.0220) (0.0422) (0.0191) (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0244) (0.0244) 
Socioeconomic 
variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Housing variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District ﬁxed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,978 17,978 17,978 40,737 40,737 40,737 17,978 17,978 
R -squared 0.0761 0.0179 0.0995 0.0299 0.7574 0.7575 0.7850 0.7851 
Agent dummy are insigniﬁcant, indicating that there is no 
correlation between the ﬁre sale sellers and the agent buy- 
ers. The 95% conﬁdence interval of the coeﬃcient in Col- 
umn 4 is [ −0.6%, 1.6%]. There is no evidence to suggest that 
agents are more likely to buy houses from sellers involved 
in lawsuits. 
One concern is that our results could neither reject a 
zero coeﬃcient, nor reject a positive coeﬃcient on cherry 
picking. We further analyze the relationship between hous- 
ing prices and weak sellers in Column 5 to Column 8 of 
Table 6 , where the dependent variable is log-total transac- 
tion price of houses. The weak seller dummy variable has a 
value of one, if a seller is either involved in lawsuits (Col- 
umn 5 and 6) or is an individual seller (Column 7 to 8). 
We ﬁnd that houses sold by weak sellers are cheaper, and 
more speciﬁcally, houses sold by sellers involved in law- 
suits are 3.5% lower, and those sold by individual sellers 
are 9.57% lower than other comparable houses. We run the 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to account for corre- 
lations between the two regressions. Thus, cherry-picking 
individual sellers can explain about 0.21% ( = 2.15% x 9.57%) 
of agent discounts, and we can reject the hypothesis that 
the effect is larger than 0.46% at the 5% level. Cherry- 
picking sellers involved in lawsuits can explain about 0.02% 
( = 0.49% x 3.5%), and we can reject the hypothesis that the 
effect is lar ger than 0.06% at the 5% level. Therefore, even 
if the cherry picking of sellers were not rejected, the ef- 
fect is unlikely to explain the observed agent discounts of 
2.54% in the main results. 
In summary, there is no evidence suggesting that agent 
buyers are more likely to buy houses from the weak sell- 
ers, either individual sellers or distressed sellers. Our re- 
sults do not support the hypothesis that real estate agents 
use information advantages to cherry pick weak sellers in 
the market. 
4.3.2. Intensive margin: bargaining power of agents 
The second possible explanation is that real estate 
agents use information advantages on the intensive mar- 
gin to tilt their bargaining power against weak sellers. We 
test the bargaining power channel by adding an interactive 
term, (Agent it x k j ), to the extended log-price model: 
ln 
(
P i , d , t 
)
= α + β × Agen t it + 
2 ∑ 
j=1 
θ j ×
(
Agen t it × k j 
)
+ 
2 ∑ 
j=1 
δ j × k j + γX i + μd + ϕ t + ε itd , (4) 
A negative coeﬃcient on the interaction term 
(Agent it ×k j ) implies that agents receive larger dis- 
counts when buying houses from weak sellers. The result, 
if signiﬁcant, is consistent with the bargaining power 
explanation. We use the same two sellers’ characteristics 
(individual sellers and sellers involved in lawsuits) to 
proxy weak sellers. 
Based on the ﬁrst proxy, we identify individuals (owner 
occupiers) who face liquidity constraints in their mobility 
decisions as weak sellers. Given that they live in the same 
houses that they sold, they were under the time pres- 
sure to sell their existing houses in the shortest possible 
time so that they could use the proceeds to pay for their 
new houses. However, investors, who usually own multiple 
houses, would not face such time pressure in selling their 
houses. The exit strategies of investors, who are strong ne- 
gotiators and more informed about housing price trends, 
are motivated by investment returns. Institutions are not 
liquidity-constrained sellers, and they buy houses to pro- 
vide residences as the perks for their top foreign execu- 
tives. They will sell the houses quickly when the houses 
are no longer needed for their foreign executives and move 
Please cite this article as: S. Agarwal, J. He and T.F. Sing et al., Do real estate agents have information advantages in housing 
markets? Journal of Financial Economics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jﬁneco.2019.05.008 
16 S. Agarwal, J. He and T.F. Sing et al. / Journal of Financial Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: FINEC [m3Gdc; May 27, 2019;18:31 ] 
Table 7 
Bargaining power of real estate agents: weak sellers. 
This table shows results of OLS regression analysis using the resale samples. The dependent variable is the log-total 
price of houses. “Agent” is a dummy variable that has a value of one, if a buyer is also an agent, and zero otherwise. 
“Before lawsuits” and “After lawsuits” are time dummies that represent transactions that occur before or after the law 
events convicted by sellers. The control variables in the model include housing variables using the house characteristics 
and socioeconomic variations using the buyer characteristics. The spatial ﬁxed effect, which is represented by the 28 
planning districts, and the transaction year ﬁxed effects are included in the regression. Regression results in Columns 
1, 2, 4, and 5 are estimated using the full resale sample, whereas Column 3 is estimated using samples that exclude 
institutional sellers. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
Sample Resale samples Exclude institutional seller Resale samples 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Agent −0.0233 ∗∗∗ −0.0232 ∗∗∗ −0.0235 ∗∗∗ −0.0241 ∗∗∗ −0.0239 ∗∗∗
(0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0081) (0.0053) (0.0053) 
Institutional seller 0.1104 ∗∗∗ 0.1103 ∗∗∗
(0.0044) (0.0044) 
Investor seller 0.0324 ∗∗∗ 0.0330 ∗∗∗ 0.0264 ∗∗∗
(0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0082) 
Agent × Institutional seller −0.0132 −0.0129 
(0.0180) (0.0180) 
Agent × Investor seller 0.0126 0.0166 0.0133 
(0.0357) (0.0361) (0.0349) 
Lawsuits −0.0344 ∗∗∗
(0.0048) 
Agent × Lawsuits −0.0086 
(0.0192) 
Before lawsuits −0.0298 ∗∗∗
(0.0108) 
After lawsuits −0.0447 ∗∗∗
(0.0104) 
Agent ×Before lawsuits 0.0315 
(0.0413) 
Agent ×After lawsuits −0.0545 
(0.0382) 
Intercept 13.1007 ∗∗∗ 13.0787 ∗∗∗ 13.1314 ∗∗∗ 13.1218 ∗∗∗ 13.1218 ∗∗∗
(0.0231) (0.0241) (0.0262) (0.0180) (0.0180) 
Socioeconomic variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District ﬁxed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year ﬁxed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,148 18,148 13,847 40,737 40,737 
R -squared 0.7856 0.7860 0.8019 0.7575 0.7575 
the housing sale proceeds back into the ﬁrms for other 
operational needs. Firms do not usually haggle on selling 
prices as long as they are able to recover their costs after 
depreciation from their sales. Based on the seller charac- 
teristics, we hypothesize that individual and institutional 
sellers are more likely to face time pressure to sell their 
houses compared to investors, who are more likely to wait 
for the right prices before selling their houses. Therefore, 
individuals and institutions do not have as strong a bar- 
gaining power as investors in selling their houses in the 
market. 
The results for the models in Eq. (4) are summarized 
in the ﬁrst three columns of Table 7 . Using individuals as 
the reference in Columns 1 and 2, we ﬁnd that the agents’ 
price advantages are signiﬁcant when they engage in trans- 
actions with individual sellers. For transactions involving 
individual sellers, real estate agents pay 2.33% lower in 
prices when buying houses for their own use compared 
to other comparable houses bought by nonagent buyers. 
The coeﬃcients on institutions (Columns 1 and 2) and 
investors (Column 2) are positive, indicating that houses 
bought from institutional sellers and investors (control- 
ling for the buyers’ characteristics) are higher relative to 
houses bought from individuals. When we interact the 
Agent with the two sellers’ dummies (institutions and in- 
vestors) (with the individual sellers as the reference), we 
ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients on the Agent × Institutions are 
negative at −1.32% (Column 1) and −1.29% (Column 2) af- 
ter controlling for buyers’ characteristics. The coeﬃcients 
on Agent × Investors are positive at 1.26% and 1.66% in the 
base model (Column 1) and the model with controlled so- 
cioeconomic variables (Column 2), respectively, but the re- 
sults are statistically insigniﬁcant. The results imply that 
while agents enjoy 2.33% discounts when buying houses 
from individual sellers, they enjoy larger discounts when 
buying houses from institutional sellers. However, we ﬁnd 
no signiﬁcant discounts in the transactions involving in- 
vestor sellers. When we exclude institutional sellers from 
the samples and reestimate the model in Column 3, the 
results are consistent with the early results in Columns 1 
and 2. 
Using the weak sellers involved in lawsuits as an al- 
ternative proxy, we estimate the log-unit price models in 
Eq. (4) by replacing the seller identity k i with the law- 
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suits dummy that denotes distressed sellers who are un- 
der pressure to sell their houses in the shortest possible 
time. The results are summarized in Columns 4 and 5 of 
Table 7 . The results in Column 4 show that the Agent coef- 
ﬁcient is signiﬁcant at −2.41%, which indicates that agents 
could exploit their information advantages by paying lower 
prices when buying their own houses from the average 
sellers without lawsuits. The lawsuits dummy is signiﬁ- 
cant at −3.44%, indicating that sellers involved in law- 
suits sell their houses for even larger discounts, which is 
consistent with the ﬁre sales cases. However, the interac- 
tive term Agent × Lawsuits is not signiﬁcant in the model, 
which implies that there are no signiﬁcant price differ- 
ences between agent buyers and nonagent buyers when 
buying houses from the distressed sellers. 
The early model, which does not control for the se- 
quence of the law events and the housing transactions, 
could bias the results downward. We further differentiate 
sellers’ housing sales that occur before the law events from 
those sold under ﬁre sale conditions after the law events 
by deﬁning two new time dummies-Before lawsuits, which 
has a value of one if a housing transaction occurs before 
the seller of the house is sued in a law event or zero oth- 
erwise, and After lawsuits, which has a value of one if a 
housing transaction occurs on or after the date of a law 
event in which the seller is sued or zero otherwise. We 
rerun the log-price model and report the results in Col- 
umn 5 of Table 7 . The results show that the Agent coeﬃ- 
cient is still signiﬁcant at −2.39%, and more interestingly, 
the two time dummy variables Before lawsuits and After 
lawsuits are also signiﬁcant at −2.98% and −4.47%, respec- 
tively. When we interact the two time dummies with the 
Agent, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients on the two interactive 
terms have opposite signs. The coeﬃcient of 3.15% on the 
Agent ×Before lawsuits variable indicates that agent buy- 
ers enjoy smaller discounts when buying their own houses 
from sellers before the sellers were implicated in the law- 
suits. However, when agent buyers buy houses from the 
distressed sellers after the law events, the agent buyers en- 
joy a larger discount of 5.45% compared to buying compa- 
rable houses from the average sellers. 15 
In summary, the results suggest that agent buyers 
are able to bargain down prices and obtain larger dis- 
counts when buying houses from weak sellers. The re- 
sults are consistent with the explanation that agent buyers 
use information advantages to tilt their bargaining power 
against weak sellers such that they pay lower prices for 
their own house purchases relative to other non-agent 
buyers. 
15 We truncate transactions that occur outside a three-year window be- 
fore and after law events to minimize possible distortions caused by other 
unobserved extraneous factors. The results based on the truncated sam- 
ple are largely consistent with the earlier results. In addition, we sort the 
events by type into ﬁve different categories, including car accident, sale of 
goods, credit card, tenancy and bankruptcy, and run the log-total housing 
price model using only resale housing transactions for the full sample pe- 
riods. We also run the regressions using only the six-year truncated sam- 
ple period that is three years before and three years after the occurrence 
of the law events. The results are largely robust and consistent. 
4.4. Sources of information advantage: evidence from house 
listings 
This section investigates sources of information advan- 
tage by examining agent buyers’ potential choice sets us- 
ing the new listing data set. One reason that agents have 
information advantage is that they have better knowledge 
about potential houses for sale, usually through their deal- 
ings as listing agents for potential sellers. Agents will have 
more houses from which to choose in the listings when 
they consider buying houses compared to other buyers. To 
understand the information advantage channel, we need to 
know the agent buyers’ choice set of houses and how they 
pick the house they purchase from that choice set. We col- 
lect a new house listings data set in Singapore from a pro- 
prietary source covering the period from 2010 to 2013. 16 
The data set includes information on address of the houses, 
listing price, house size, posting date, and name of the 
agents posting the listing. We merge the listing data set 
with the resale transaction data set using the common ad- 
dress together with the posting date and the transaction 
date. We are able to merge approximately 40% of the resale 
transaction data to the listing data. The merging process is 
discussed in the Online Appendix. 
We construct the agent buyers’ choice set based on the 
agent buyers’ listings for the period before they buy the 
subject houses. We investigate the relationship between 
the characteristics of houses on the agents’ listings and the 
houses agents actually bought. In Column 1, Table 8 , we 
deﬁne the agent buyers’ choice set based on houses in the 
agents’ listing in a 30-day period before they bought the 
subject houses. The coeﬃcients on both the listing price 
and the days of listing (time on the market) are nega- 
tive and signiﬁcant, which suggest that the agent buyers 
choose houses with a lower listing price and with a shorter 
time on the market after the listing. 17 The magnitude is 
small; agents choose houses approximately 0.50% lower in 
listing price, which is the equivalent of approximately 20% 
of the agent discounts to the transaction prices. In Column 
2, we use the sample listings of the agent buyer in the 
window of 90 days before they buy the subject houses and 
ﬁnd the same results that agent buyers choose houses with 
a shorter time after listing and with a lower listing prices. 
In Columns 3 and 4, we add the agent buyers’ listings after 
they have bought the houses into the choice set and con- 
duct the same analyses. We ﬁnd the same patterns in the 
results, which suggest that the agent has information ad- 
vantage because they can pick cheaper houses in the list- 
ings for their own housing purchases. 
To test whether agents have information advantage over 
nonagent buyers, we conduct a counterfactual analysis 
16 The data set covers the electronic listing records found in all the ma- 
jor electronic portals used by listing agents in Singapore, which include 
PropertyGuru, 99.Co, SRX, and others, and the sample listings are large 
and representative of the available listings in the housing market in Sin- 
gapore. 
17 There is another possible explanation for shorter time on market for 
the agent buyers. Agents might be more likely to buy houses off the mar- 
ket and then put the houses on the listings before the closing to provide 
a comparison for other houses in the local areas. Due to the data limita- 
tions, we are not able to test the possible. 
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Table 8 
Choice set based on the listing data: agent buyer and nonagent buyer. 
This table shows results of OLS regression analysis. The dependent variable is a binary variable has a value of one, if the house is transacted. The agent buyers’ choice set based on the listing they represent 
before and after they buy houses. The control variables in the model include housing variables using the house characteristics and socioeconomic variations using the buyer characteristics. The spatial ﬁxed effect, 
which is represented by the 28 planning districts, and the transaction year ﬁxed effects are included in the regression. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Agent buyer’s choice Nonagent buyer’s choice (same day match) 
Choice sample Listing date within 
30 days before 
transaction date 
Listing date within 
90 days before 
transaction date 
Listing date within 
30 days before and 
after transaction 
date 
Listing date within 
90 days before and 
after transaction 
date 
Listing date within 
30 days before 
transaction date 
Listing date within 
90 days before 
transaction date 
Listing date within 
30 days before and 
after transaction 
date 
Listing date within 
90 days before and 
after transaction 
date 
Dependent variable House bought = 1 House bought = 1 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log(Listing price) −0.0050 ∗ −0.0033 ∗∗∗ −0.0095 ∗∗∗ −0.0047 ∗∗∗ 0.0 0 02 −0.0 0 04 0.0015 −0.0013 
(0.0030) (0.0013) (0.0032) (0.0012) (0.0030) (0.0022) (0.0035) (0.0021) 
Log(Days from listing 
to transaction) 
−0.0169 ∗∗∗
(0.0025) 
−0.0112 ∗∗∗
(0.0 0 09) 
−0.0120 ∗∗∗
(0.0021) 
−0.0089 ∗∗∗
(0.0 0 07) 
−0.0071 ∗∗∗
(0.0025) 
−0.0097 ∗∗∗
(0.0014) 
−0.0019 
(0.0022) 
−0.0105 ∗∗∗
(0.0011) 
Intercept 0.1246 −0.3503 ∗∗∗ 0.1243 −0.3691 ∗∗∗ 1.0052 ∗∗∗ 1.0746 ∗∗∗ 0.2724 1.0655 ∗∗∗
(0.1718) (0.0465) (0.2382) (0.0552) (0.2169) (0.2125) (0.1767) (0.1551) 
Socioeconomic 
variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Housing variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Person ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5127 14,024 6719 19,933 6029 12,119 7917 19,044 
R -squared 0.3972 0.4825 0.4114 0.4927 0.9327 0.9158 0.9249 0.9015 
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Table 9 
Information advantage of real estate agent over weak seller. 
This table shows results of OLS regression analysis. The dependent variables are deﬁned in the top row of the table. “Log(TOM)” is log-time on the market, 
where time on the market is deﬁned by the days from listing date to transaction date. “Log(Listing price)” is log-listing price of houses. “Bargaining 
power” is deﬁned by log difference between the transaction price and the listing price. “Performance1 of seller’s representative agent” is the number of 
house he/she represent over a year in our listing data. “Performance2 of seller’s representative agent” is the number of house he/she represent over a 
year in our transacted data. “Agent” is a dummy variable that has a value of one, if a buyer is also an agent, and zero otherwise. The control variables in 
the model include housing variables using the house characteristics and socioeconomic variations using the buyer characteristics. The spatial ﬁxed effect, 
which is represented by the 28 planning districts, and the transaction year ﬁxed effects are included in the regression. Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Sample Public sample 
Dependent variable Log(TOM) Log(Listing price) Bargaining power Performance1 of seller’s 
representative agent 
Performance2 of seller’s 
representative agent 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Agent −0.4614 ∗∗∗ −0.0127 −0.0179 ∗∗ −0.0821 −0.1789 
(0.1147) (0.0212) (0.0088) (0.0846) (0.1491) 
Log(TOM) 0.0 0 01 0.0130 ∗∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0017) 
Log(Listing price) 0.0019 −0.1246 ∗∗∗
(0.1198) (0.0088) 
Bargaining power 2.2135 ∗∗∗ −0.7154 ∗∗∗
(0.2829) (0.0504) 
Weak seller −0.3319 0.0032 0.0175 −0.2322 −0.2031 
(0.2838) (0.0522) (0.0224) (0.2100) (0.3701) 
Agent ∗Weak seller −1.3064 −0.2437 0.0091 −0.0894 −0.2686 
(1.2903) (0.2374) (0.0717) (0.9769) (1.7213) 
Intercept 4.0374 ∗∗ 12.9073 ∗∗∗ 1.5532 ∗∗∗ 0.1181 1.5085 ∗∗∗
(1.6011) (0.0781) (0.1182) (0.3141) (0.5534) 
Socioeconomic variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Housing variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2102 2102 2102 2175 2175 
R -squared 0.4381 0.8193 0.2302 0.0349 0.0369 
by assigning the agent buyer’s choice set as the placebo 
choice set to the nonagent buyers. We assume that the 
agent buyers have larger choice set due to the nature of 
their work. If an agent buyer and a nonagent buyer bought 
houses on the same day, we use the agent buyer’s choice 
set as a placebo choice set for the nonagent buyer. We 
show that agent buyers pick cheaper houses from their 
choice set. Given that the nonagent buyers are assigned the 
same placebo choice set, and if agent buyers have informa- 
tion advantage over nonagent buyers, we should observe 
that nonagent buyers buy houses with the same price in 
the placebo choice set. From Columns 5 to 8 in Table 8 , 
we ﬁnd that nonagent buyers buy their houses with the 
same prices as the prices in the placebo choice set. There- 
fore, from the same listing set, agent buyers are able to 
choose a lower listing price compared to nonagent buyers. 
The results suggest that one source of information advan- 
tage comes from the choice set of houses in the agents’ 
listings. Agent buyers make a better choice by choosing 
houses with lower listing prices, whereas nonagent buy- 
ers do not have that information in making their housing 
choice decisions. 
Based on the merged listing data, we next test the in- 
formation advantages of agent buyers using three new out- 
comes: time on the market, listing price, and bargaining 
power. The time on the market is deﬁned by the number 
of days between the listing date and the transaction date. 
Bargaining power is deﬁned by the log difference between 
the transaction price and the listing price where a more 
negative value implies greater bargaining power of agent 
buyers. The results of the log-time on the market model in 
Column 1, Table 9 show that agent buyers choose houses 
that stay 46% less time on the market, which is equivalent 
to approximately 79 days on the market. They also choose 
houses with a lower listing price, but the result is not sta- 
tistically signiﬁcant. Interestingly, while both agent buyers 
and nonagent buyers are able to bargain the prices down 
from the listing prices, agent buyers bargain the prices 
down by 1.8% more from the listing prices, which is ap- 
proximately 70% of the agent discounts based on the av- 
erage transaction price estimated in the main results. The 
results suggest that agent buyers have relatively stronger 
bargaining power than nonagent buyers. 
Why do agent buyers have stronger bargaining power 
than nonagent buyers? One possible explanation is that 
agent buyers with information advantages could bargain 
down the prices more easily relative to non-agent buyers. 
One source of information could come from the previous 
purchase price of the same house. The literature shows 
that home sellers often use the past purchase price as a 
reference point ( Genesove and Mayer 2001 ). If agent buy- 
ers learn about low prices in the previous purchases, they 
could bargain with the seller to bring the listing price 
down to a level that is close to the previous purchase price. 
In Singapore, real estate agents could access past 
housing transaction price data through either a publicly 
available website of the URA, a government agency in 
Singapore, or through the agents’ own ﬁrm database. Real 
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Table 10 
Bargaining power of real estate agents with information advantage. 
This table shows results of OLS regression analysis. The dependent variables are deﬁned in the top row of the table. “Log(previous purchase price)” is 
log-previous purchase price, where previous purchase price is deﬁned as the last transaction price of building. “Log(transaction price)” is log-transaction 
price of houses. “Bargaining power” is deﬁned by log difference between the transaction price and the listing price. “Agent” is a dummy variable that has 
a value of one, if a buyer is also an agent, and zero otherwise. The control variables in the model include housing variables using the house characteristics 
and socioeconomic variations using the buyer characteristics. The spatial ﬁxed effect, which is represented by the 28 planning districts, and the transaction 
year ﬁxed effects are included in the regression. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Dependent variable Log(previous purchase price) Log(transaction price) Listing price premium Bargaining power 
Sample All samples Matched sample 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Agent −0.0212 ∗∗ −0.0943 
(0.0091) (0.1024) 
Agent with high previous purchase price 0.0589 ∗∗∗
(0.0116) 
Agent with low previous purchase price −0.0729 ∗∗∗
(0.0107) 
Agent with unknown previous purchase price −0.0250 ∗∗∗
(0.0034) 
Nonagent with high previous purchase price 0.0719 ∗∗∗
(0.0030) 
Nonagent with low previous purchase price −0.0599 ∗∗∗
(0.0030) 
Agent with high listing price premium −0.0616 ∗∗∗
(0.0197) 
Agent with low listing price premium 0.0116 
(0.0197) 
Agent with unknown listing price premium −0.0276 ∗∗
(0.0112) 
Nonagent with high listing price premium −0.0295 ∗∗∗
(0.0073) 
Nonagent with low listing price premium 0.0163 ∗∗
(0.0070) 
Intercept 12.6857 ∗∗∗ 13.0525 ∗∗∗ −0.3550 −0.0151 
(0.0365) (0.0130) (0.3635) (0.0338) 
Socioeconomic variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Housing variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,440 105,929 556 2175 
R -squared 0.6702 0.7875 0.1077 0.1394 
estate agents acquire information advantages via their 
dealings in the market and interaction with other agents 
and sellers/buyers, and that information gives agents an 
edge over nonagents in identifying and buying houses at 
bargain prices. This explanation, if not rejected, predicts 
that agent buyers have stronger bargaining power and 
obtain more price discounts when buying houses with 
relatively low prices in the previous sales. We test the 
prediction and report the results in Table 10 . In Column 1, 
we ﬁnd that agent buyers are more likely to choose houses 
with low prices in the previous sales compared to nona- 
gent buyers. In Column 2, we deﬁne a house as having a 
high previous purchase price if the previous purchase price 
was above the median purchase price in our sample. We 
ﬁnd that agent buyers enjoy 7.3% discounts when buying 
houses with a low previous purchase price. By contrast, 
nonagent buyers only enjoy a 6% discount when buying 
similar houses. Agent buyers enjoy larger discounts when 
they buy houses with low prices in previous sales. In 
Columns 3 and 4, we deﬁne the listing price premium as 
the difference between the listing price and the previous 
purchase price using the merged listing data. When the 
listing price premium is high, buyers are likely to have 
large bargaining power. We ﬁnd that both agent buyers 
and nonagent buyers have large bargaining power when 
the listing price premium is high. They can bargain down 
the price by 6.2% and 3.0%, respectively. Agent buyers 
have greater bargaining power for houses with high listing 
price premiums. The results imply that agent buyers with 
information advantages in previous purchase price have 
stronger bargaining power. 
In summary, agent discounts are likely to come from 
both information advantage and bargaining power, and the 
bargaining power story contributes more to the agent dis- 
counts in the main results. Agent buyers have informa- 
tion advantage over nonagent buyers, given that they have 
a larger choice set from which to choose and thus pick 
cheaper houses. Agent buyers, who are better informed of 
past transaction prices, are found to have stronger power 
in bargaining down the purchase prices on houses. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper extends the early empirical studies on infor- 
mation advantages and market distortion in the real estate 
brokerage industry using Singapore’s real estate market 
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data. We merge multiple data sets from different sources, 
which include the registry of real estate agents (salesper- 
sons), law events, personal details with current home ad- 
dresses, and the transaction records of more than 10 0,0 0 0 
private non-landed houses in Singapore, for the periods 
from 1995 to 2012. With these large and unique merged 
data sets, we empirically test information advantages of 
real estate brokers/agents and sources of information ad- 
vantages used by agents in buying their own houses. The 
empirical evidence, which derives mainly from the buy- 
side activities of agents, adds a new contribution to the 
early evidence of US studies that use data from the sale- 
side activities. We ﬁnd strong evidence to suggest that real 
estate agents exploit information advantages when buying 
houses for their own use and that they pay approximately 
2.54% less for their houses relative to comparable houses 
bought by nonagent buyers. We conduct various robust- 
ness tests using the repeat sales samples and the matched 
samples derived from the PSM technique, and the results 
remain robust and consistent. 
We ﬁnd that agent buyers have more information ad- 
vantages in a less informative environment, and high abil- 
ity agent buyers have even more information advantages. 
Given the asymmetries in information, we also ﬁnd that 
nonagent sellers (buyers) are less likely to trade with agent 
buyers (agent sellers) who are well informed. In equilib- 
rium, there is a segmentation in the market where agent 
sellers are more likely to sell to agent buyers. These results 
are consistent with the predictions of information asym- 
metries in Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004) and Levitt and 
Syverson (2008) . 
We further investigate sources of information advantage 
and show that agent discounts come from both extensive 
margin (cherry picking) and intensive margin (bargaining 
power of agent buyers). We show stronger evidence sup- 
porting the bargaining power story relative to the cherry 
picking story in explaining the agent discounts. Agent buy- 
ers use their information advantage from their choice set 
of houses to cherry pick cheaper houses relative to non- 
agent buyers. Information advantage gives greater bargain- 
ing power for agent buyers to buy their own houses at 
lower prices relative to other nonagent buyers. The results 
contribute to the literature by showing that real estate 
agents with special knowledge could tilt bargaining power 
to their favor and cause price distortion in the real estate 
market. Our ﬁndings also contribute to the broader litera- 
ture that examines the role of ﬁnancial intermediaries in 
the markets subject to information asymmetries. 
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